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DIVINE AND MORTAL MOTIVATION:  





The paper discusses Heidegger’s early notion of the “movedness of life” (Lebensbewegtheit) 
and its intimate connection with Aristotle’s concept of movement (kinēsis). Heidegger’s aim 
in the period of Being and Time was to “overcome” the Greek ideal of being as ousia – 
constant and complete presence and availability – by showing that the background for all 
meaningful presence is Dasein, the ecstatically temporal context of human being. Life as the 
event of finitude is characterized by an essential lack and incompleteness, and the living 
present therefore gains meaning only in relation to a horizon of un-presence and un-
availability. Whereas the “theological” culmination of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics finds 
the supreme fulfillment of human life in the semi-divine self-immanence and self-sufficiency 
of the bios theōrētikos, a radical Heideggerian interpretation of kinēsis may permit us to find 
in Aristotle the fundamental structures of mortal living as self-transcendent movement.      
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Vita maxime in motu manifestatur 
Life is most manifest in movement. 
(St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa contra gentiles, IV, 20.) 
 
We know that in the early 1920s, Heidegger frequently referred to his main project – the 
background for his famed lecture courses in Freiburg and Marburg – as “Phenomenological 
Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle” (Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu 
Aristoteles). Although at some point around 1924, the Aristotle project was definitely 
supplanted by, or rather transformed into, the Being and Time project1, it is clear that 
Heidegger never abandoned the essential insights of his Aristotle readings but rather 
incorporated them into Being and Time and his later works. Most scholars now agree that 
Heidegger’s encounter with Aristotle was decisive for the initial orientation of his “path of 
thinking.” Thomas Sheehan, notably, has suggested that understanding Heidegger’s 
reappropriation of the intertwined Aristotelian concepts dynamis (capacity, potentiality) and 
kinēsis (movement, process) would, in particular, permit us to approach the sole unifying 
“matter” (Sache) of Heidegger’s thought as a whole – the matter which Heidegger from the 
1930s onward referred to as Ereignis, the event or “taking-place” of meaningfulness.2  
 Heidegger’s “Natorp account”3 from 1922 shows that this matter was present already 
in the very earliest phase of Heidegger’s career. Here, Heidegger sets forth precisely the task 
of understanding Aristotle’s ontology of movement as well as the connection of this ontology 
with Aristotle’s understanding of “the movedness of living” (Lebensbewegtheit)4. “[. . .] the 
ontological structure of human being is understood on the basis of an ontology of beings in 
the how of a particular kind of movedness [Bewegtheit] and on the basis of the ontological 
radicalization of the idea of this kind of movedness.”5 In what follows, I will discuss 
precisely this phenomenon, which can be seen as the very focal point of Heidegger’s 
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interpretation of Aristotle: the movement, mobility or “motivation” of living. Pursuing the 
path indicated by Sheehan, I will try to show how Heidegger “reads Aristotle against 
Aristotle” in trying to find in the concept of kinēsis6 a formulation of the ontological structure 
of human life that is more original and more appropriate (eigentlich) – phenomenologically 
more adequate to the phenomenon itself – than the one found in Aristotle’s specific reflection 
on the final ends and the supreme essence of living. Whereas Aristotle himself found the 
essence of human life precisely in the attainment of a certain degree of immortality and 
permanent presence, a radical reappropriation of the Aristotelian concept of kinēsis may 
indeed permit us to call into question this “theological” dimension of Aristotle’s ethics and to 
think of life as the foundational event of mortality and finitude. 
   
Being-in-possession and being-out-after 
What is the most fundamental principle of Aristotle’s philosophy? Heidegger’s answer to this 
question is well-known: this principle is expressed by the Greek word ousia, literally 
“beingness,” which Heidegger mostly interprets as Anwesenheit, “presence,” “being-in-
possession,” or Vorhandenheit, “availability,” “being-at-hand.”7 Ousia indicates, according 
to Heidegger, nothing less than the basic and initial meaning of being for Aristotle. It is a 
principle which Aristotle explicates and articulates in such fundamental investigations as 
Books Zeta and Eta of the Metaphysics and the treatise on the Categories. Ousia means the 
“substantial” way of being, the first, “underlying” (Greek hypokeimenon, Latin substantia) 
category of being of which the other categories are predicated: independence of other beings, 
self-identity, unity, uniformity, fundamentality, indivisibility and permanence.8 All of these, 
Heidegger says, are basically aspects of the one and same fundamental character of the 
beingness of beings – constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit). This initial grasp of the 
comprehensive sense of being has, in the course of the unfolding of the Western tradition of 
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thought, become so self-evident that it is no longer even a theme for investigation. In the 
Heideggerian schema, it was the epochal unfolding of different implicit aspects of ousia that 
produced the medieval theology of the Christian God as the ens realissimum, as the most real 
and substantial (most constantly present) of beings; the Cartesian interpretation of the 
cognizing I-subject (cogito) as indubitably certain self-presence; the Hegelian interpretation 
of history as an unfolding of the absolute presence-to-itself of subjectivity; and, as its final 
phase, Nietzsche’s thought of the “will to power” as the urge of the living subject to secure 
its self-presence through self-assertion.9 
The Heideggerian interpretation of ousia is perhaps best illustrated by Heidegger’s 
counterexample to this principle: factical life in its motional and motivational way of being. 
As analyzed by Heidegger, the human Dasein, in its most proper mode (Eigentlichkeit), 
simply does not present itself as a stable, unified, complete, finished, self-sufficient and 
perfect presence-in-itself-and-to-itself. Instead, human being has its very own way of taking 
place, characterized by Heidegger in Being and Time as “ek-sistence” or “ek-static 
temporality,”10 expressions that literally mean “standing outside”; human being is essentially 
“outside itself,” that is, outside and beyond a purely present now of self-grasping, self-
identity and self-coincidence. The manner in which Dasein is is captured by the expression 
care (Sorge), which is explicated as “being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world) as being-
alongside (beings encountered within-the-world)”.11 This complex structure is then 
elucidated in temporal terms in Part I, Division 2 of Being and Time, “Dasein and 
Temporality,” especially in Section 65, “Temporality as the ontological meaning of care.” 
Human being is essentially “ahead of itself,” futural – that is, life is lived ahead, life always 
gains present sense or meaning from the future (Zukunft), from the possibilities and goals at 
which it is oriented, and sees its past, its already-having-lived (Gewesenheit), as meaningful 
through the possibilities it opens up for the future. Human being is essentially “already in the 
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world,” historical – that is, any meaningful present situation of life is meaningful on the basis 
of a de facto background, an “always already” past, a tradition which generates and delimits 
in advance one’s own factical possibilities. Only thus can human being be “alongside beings” 
– that is, encounter beings as meaningfully present in a lived situation (Gegenwart). In the 
Natorp account, Heidegger has a very apt expression for this “self-external” character: being-
alive is essentially Aussein auf etwas, “being out for something,” “being out after 
something.”12   
In other words, human being is attracted, moved – “motivated” in the literal sense of 
the word – outwards, into exteriority, and this outward motivation then constitutes the 
transcendent character of living. However, there is no prior immanent or interior self or 
underlying subject to be transcended, nor is human being motivated by anything exterior to 
itself. Human being as such is its own outward motivation: it is a movement into its own 
unrealized possibilities, and these possibilities are precisely what life itself is all about, the 
source of its selfhood.13 What human being as a whole aims at in its movement is precisely 
itself as a possibility. In Heidegger’s formulation: “Dasein exists for the sake of a can-be 
[Seinkönnen] of itself.”14  
Precisely because of this constitutive self-motivated and self-transcendent mobility, 
life cannot be grasped radically and adequately through the category of ousia. Human being 
is never wholly encapsulated within a self-sufficient present moment or a now, but is always 
outside and beyond the present, which, in fact, can be meaningfully present only in relation 
to what is precisely non-present: that-toward-which (future, possibility) and that-out-of-
which (past, history) life is being lived. There is no immanence without transcendence. 
Human being is not the state of being-alive – it is the event, the coming-to-pass of living. As 
long as life is life, it cannot be “finished with” – life does not attain the most perfect form of 
actuality, entelecheia, “having-reached-completeness,” which Heidegger interprets as the 
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simple resting of a being in its most perfect form of presence in itself and as itself, its eidos.15 
On the contrary, living is essentially characterized by perpetual unrest (Unruhe).16  
Yet even though human being is always still “on the way” to itself, living one’s life is 
not simply a process of production, Greek poiēsis, which would be completed upon reaching 
some final goal or end, telos, lying outside the process itself. Human being is not unfinished 
in the sense that a building under construction is unfinished. In any given situation of life, the 
unfinished project I am carrying on with is my life itself. Human being in its unfinished 
fullness is always already “going on,” “in full swing” – energeia, “already operative”17. Life 
is simply this being-on-the-way to itself.18  
In this sense, the movement of human being fits the Aristotelian definition of praxis as 
pure activity that always already contains its own telos and goes on for its own sake.19 Yet 
for Aristotle, praxis in the most authentic sense is a self-immanent motion, a movement 
entirely devoid of exteriority or incompleteness – that is, rest – whereas life, in any given 
situation, also has unrealized possibilities and potentialities, Greek dynameis. There is always 
some “unfinished business” in life. As a self-transcendent and outwards-motivated 
movement, human being as a whole does not have the self-immanence of praxis. Human 
being is actualized precisely as long as it has purely potential, unrealized possibilities. When 
there are no more open possibilities, life is indeed “finished,” but in the sense that it is “over 
and done with.”20 The ecstatic temporality of Dasein thus transgresses and eludes the 
fundamental classification of activities under poiēsis and praxis: it is a movement that has the 
transcendence of poiēsis and yet does not attain any external goal but, like praxis, takes place 
for its own sake.21 This paradoxical way of being – being fully realized precisely in not-yet-




A life of one’s own 
How, then, can the question of the essence of human being as life be addressed from within 
the framework of ousia? Aristotle’s “theological” answer in Book X of the Nicomachean 
Ethics to the question concerning the final end, the telos, of human life is one of the most 
decisive moves in the development of Western thought. Here Aristotle’s ethical search for 
the most appropriate human living ends in the conclusion that its fullest realization takes 
place in the “theoretical” way of life, bios theōrētikos.22 Theōria or theōrein means simply 
the “disinterested,” non-instrumental beholding of reality – specifically, of the fundamental 
and necessary, eternal structures of reality. In the activity of theōrein, the living soul ceases 
to be “out for something,” as it constantly is in ordinary life, and concentrates on beholding 
the permanently and fully present purely for the sake of this presence itself, without reference 
to any non-actualized possibilities or goals. This makes theōria the most powerful (kratistē), 
the most contiguous (synechestatē), the most pleasant (hēdistē) and the most self-sufficient 
and independent (autarkestatos) – all in all, the most present-to-itself and the most fully 
actualized – form of living one’s life.23 Theōria is not an opposite of praxis, of human 
activity concerned about itself, on the contrary, it is the perfection of praxis: a movement of 
life that is motivated purely by the full presence of the fully present.24 In a certain sense, 
Aristotle says, this form of living is an athanatizein, “being-immortal” – it entails a certain 
release from human mortality and finitude.25 As such, theoretical life is also the most 
“divine” (theion) way of life possible for the human being.26  
 Heidegger emphasizes that in Aristotle, “divine” is to be understood strictly as an 
ontological term meaning simply “immortal,” “self-sufficient” and “most being.”27 In Book 
Lambda of the Metaphysics, divinity, the divine way of being – here understood as an ideal 
that human life may at best approach but never, because of its essential imperfection, 
permanently attain – is described as having its essence in nous, insight or apprehension, i.e., 
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in the pure, immediate, non-propositional, non-discursive, non-temporal and non-analyzable 
grasping of indivisible and permanent truths, and particularly in noēsis noēseōs, in the self-
referential divine apprehension apprehending purely itself. The perfection of God entails 
active awareness, and in order to be perfect, this can only be God’s self-awareness of his own 
perfect activity.28 God is simply the most perfect presence-in-itself-and-to-itself, without any 
reference outside or beyond itself. “Indeed, we maintain the divinity [theos] to be a constant 
and most excellent living being, so that in the divinity a contiguous and constant living [zōē] 
and span of being are present. For this is precisely what the divinity is.”29  
Aristotle thus sees the supreme and essential possibility of life in a certain freeing 
oneself from mortality and intentionality, from being “out for something.” One must, in a 
way, “cease to exist” in order to realize one’s most supreme possibilities as a human being – 
which, at the same time, means approaching divinity. Aristotle thus draws the full “ethical” 
conclusions from the initial identification of beingness with constant presence. What he 
envisages as the most authentic and perfect human life is already indicated in the reputed 
words of Anaxagoras, cited in a fragment supposedly belonging to Aristotle’s lost 
Protrepticus:  
 
And when somebody asked Anaxagoras for what end one would choose to come into 
being and to live, he is said to have answered the question by saying: “To observe 
[theasasthai] the heavens and the stars, moon and sun in them,” everything else being 
nothing worth.30  
 
In the Natorp-Bericht, Heidegger briefly points out how decisive this Aristotelian 
interpretation of the essence and actuality of human life has been for the entire later tradition 
of thought, for what Heidegger calls the “Graeco-Christian interpretation of life.”31 In 
 9 
Aristotle’s treatises Heidegger sees at work the constant tendency of Western thought to what 
he was later to call “forgetfulness of being” (Seinsvergessenheit), especially in its 
fundamental “ethical” aspect as forgetfulness of human being. Aristotle’s conclusion – bios 
theōrētikos as the most perfect form of life – is, in a sense, inevitable, granted that ousia is 
from the outset accepted as the most fundamental sense of being.   
In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics – a text to which Heidegger devoted the first 
part of his famous lecture course on Plato’s Sophist in 1924–25 – Aristotle defines the five 
“virtues of discursive thought” (arētai dianoētikai) through which the soul “dwells in the 
disclosedness of beings” (alētheuei): know-how (technē), intellectual mastery (epistēmē), 
situational prudence (phronēsis), comprehensive understanding (sofia), immediate insight 
(nous).32 Of these, the two principal faculties are phronēsis, i.e., the ability to disclose the 
active situations of life through the inherent possibilities that they offer for the appropriate 
life as a whole, and sophia, i.e., comprehension of reality in its fullness with a view to its 
fundamental and immutable principles and structures.33 At the end of Book VI, Aristotle 
addresses the question: which of these is the superior and more profound way of access to the 
disclosedness of beings? Here Aristotle makes an ontological choice which, in the horizon of 
ousia, seems inevitable.  
 
Thus it is evident that sophia must be the most rigorous form of knowledge [epistēmē]. 
[. . .] For it would be quite out-of-place [atopon] if someone should judge [. . .] 
phronēsis to be the most profound kind of knowledge, unless humans were to be 
superior to all the other beings in the celestial order [kosmos].34  
 
The fundamental reason for this is that phronēsis, which discloses lived reality by grasping 
each situation in its possibilities, is directed at that which is “contingent,” admits of being 
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otherwise (ta endechomena allōs echein), and in fact always is otherwise35 – no two lived 
situations are the same, each one is unique – whereas sophia articulates meaningfulness 
through the fundamental and necessary principles that are never other than what they are.36 In 
other words, phronēsis refers to the non-permanence, goal-orientedness, historicity, 
temporality and contingency of concretely lived human situations, while sophia is related to 
what is most permanently present, thus most being, most real.     
  The ultimate ethical criteria for the determination of the perfection and full actuality 
of human life are thus not taken from the structures of human living itself, but from what is 
permanently and unchangingly present, “divine.” Still, phronēsis, mindfulness of the 
situation, is the primary form of access to reality, in that it is impossible to carry out the 
proper goals and ends of human life if one is not first able to grasp and to act out the singular 
lived situations in view of these goals and ends. “From what has been discussed, it is quite 
clear that one is not fit to be excellent [agathon] in the proper sense without phronēsis.”37 In 
his reading of Aristotle’s treatment of phronēsis, Heidegger finds that Aristotle discovers 
here the temporal structure of what in Being and Time is called the Augenblick, the “glance 
of the eye”38 – the indivisible moment, the unique situation of action and living, the kairos.39 
Phronēsis grasps each situation in its singularity and makes it possible to “act out” this 
situation, thus allowing praxis. It is defined by Aristotle as a “discursive [meta logou] and 
disclosing [alēthē] faculty in the context of acting out [praktikē], concerned with what is 
expedient for humans.”40 Phronēsis is simply the human ability to discover the proper 
purposes and goals of one’s temporal life as well as the temporality of life as such – it 
comprehends the types of intentionality which in Being and Time are referred to as prudence 
or circumspection (Umsicht), conscience (Gewissen) and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).41  
As many Heidegger scholars have shown, it is obvious that the published part of 
Being and Time largely builds on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, especially on the 
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treatment of phronēsis, which Heidegger develops, articulates and radicalizes.42 What 
Heidegger wants to do here is to give Aristotle “a new chance”43 – to work out those 
elements and to enact those possibilities of Aristotle’s phenomenology that were disregarded 
by the later tradition which, while building on the Aristotelian treatises, appropriated mainly 
those elements in Aristotle that serve the general metaphysics of ousia. These elements were 
then stiffened into dogmatic theses that gradually covered over the concrete 
phenomenological problems that Aristotle is struggling with.44 Notably, the main 
phenomenon that Heidegger seeks to un-cover, the phenomenon that is “beyond” ousia and 
in fact the prerequisite for all meaningful presence, is the transcendent mobility of living. 
 
Unfinished presence 
Kinēsis, movement, elaborated in the Physics and in Book Theta of the Metaphysics, is one 
of Aristotle’s fundamental concepts. Its meaning is not limited to spatial locomotion; in its 
broadest sense, kinēsis – sometimes synonymous with metabolē, transition – denotes all 
kinds of processes that there are, all change and alteration, all becoming in general. The very 
first chapter of the Physics declares movement to be a basic reality which simply has to be 
dealt with: “Let it be laid down as a foundation for us [in our investigation] that either all or 
some of the beings that come to be [ta physei] are in motion. This is evident on the basis of 
induction [epagōgē, i.e., letting the phenomena guide us to their general structure].”45 
What makes this point of departure radical is the fact that change and movement were 
by many earlier thinkers regarded as the very opposites to being in the Greek sense of being-
present and being-complete, and therefore excluded from philosophical consideration. In his 
poem, Parmenides makes it clear that since there is being and since there is no non-being, 
there can be no change or becoming, since that would entail something coming into being, 
into presence, from non-being, non-presence, and vice versa – what is, then, is one and 
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unified, “untrembling,” all at once.46 It is a commonplace that the Eleatics, the school of 
Parmenides, denied the reality of movement altogether; Zeno of Elea devised his famous 
paradoxes to show the impossibility of even thinking movement and change consistently.47 
According to Aristotle, the reason why these philosophers could not come to terms with the 
reality of movement was their inability to distinguish between absolute (haplōs) and 
contingent or relative (kata symbebēkos) non-being, between (a) simply not being and (b) not 
being for now but being capable of coming into being.48 The necessity of reformulating the 
thesis of Parmenides had already been seen by Plato in the Sophist: “In order to defend 
ourselves, it will be necessary for us to put to test the discourse of father Parmenides and to 
drive through by force [the thesis] that non-being [to mē on], in a certain respect, is, and as to 
being [to on], in turn, that it in a certain sense is not.”49 
In his last full-length lecture course on Aristotle from 1931 – a kind of culmination in 
the encounter with Aristotle – Heidegger discusses at length Aristotle’s dispute with the 
Megarian school in Metaphysics Theta, Ch. 3.50 Aristotle tells us here that according to the 
Megarians – contemporaries of Aristotle and intellectual descendants of Parmenides – it is 
not true to say that a builder is capable (dynasthai) of building a house if he or she is not 
actually at work (energein) building it.51 This seems to be very obviously false, but in fact, 
Heidegger points out, Aristotle has to take this argument very seriously, as it is quite 
consistent with the basic Greek conception of what “is” means.52 What the Megarians mean 
to say is that the builder’s capacity to build is not present, does not show itself, when it is not 
being exercised, that is, when the builder is not building. There cannot be any such thing as a 
pure, unrealized and merely potential possibility or capacity, dynamis – pure possibilities are 
not present, precisely because they are unrealized. Only what is fully carried out, energeia, is 
real and present. But in denying the reality of dynamis the Megarians, just like the Eleatics, 
are ultimately led to deny the reality of all movement, becoming and change, of all kinēsis in 
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general.53 For without the capacity to build the builder can never start building, in fact, the 
builder cannot be a builder, since it is on the basis of the capacity to build that he or she 
appears to us as a builder.54 In the same manner, if we follow the reasoning of the Megarians, 
there is no sense in saying that a house is now being built, in the process of being built, but is 
not yet finished – for there is no house present before there is a finished house. If, then, that 
which is not completely present and finished is simply non-present, simply non-real and non-
existent, it can never be coming to presence. Thus nothing can ever come to be or cease to 
be.   
 
For, [if we follow the argument of the Megarians,] the one who is already standing will 
always remain standing and the one who is already seated will remain seated, as this 
person will not stand up again once seated; for precisely the one who is not capable 
[dynaton] of standing up will be incapable of standing up. Now, if such things do not 
admit of being meaningfully articulated [legein], it is evident that capacity-to-be 
[dynamis] and being-already-operative [energeia] are different […], so that a thing 
capable of being something admits of [endechetai] not being [what it is capable of 
being], and accordingly, a thing capable of not being [something] admits of being [what 
it is capable of not being] [. . .].55 
 
We all see that things change, come to be something and cease to be something else. 
Moreover, as in the case of the builder, phenomena that change are meaningfully present to 
us in view of their yet unrealized capacities and possibilities, that which they are capable of 
being. The idle builder is, in a way, present to us as a builder, and a construction site is 
somehow present to us as a building that is still being built. Aristotle gives many other 
examples: what is cold or warm to touch or tastes sweet is considered to be cold, warm or 
 14 
sweet even when it is not presently felt or tasted, and the person who normally sees is not 
thought to be blind whenever his or her eyes happen to be closed.56 The meaningful presence 
of the builder, of the unfinished house, of the warm fire and of the blind person is constituted 
by the respective dynamis of each of these beings – that is, by the present reference to what 
they are presently not but what they are capable of becoming, what is only relatively absent57 
from them. It is this structure of dynamis as a constitutive relation to relative absence which 
must be kept in mind when interpreting Aristotle’s definition: “To be capable [dynaton] is 
[esti] to be something that, at the point where the being-operative [energeia] of that to which 
it is said to have the capacity starts to be present in it, will not be [estai] incapable in any 
respect.”58  
Heidegger calls this seemingly circular and trivial “definition” – what is not incapable 
is capable – an expression of “the greatest philosophical knowledge of antiquity,” “a 
knowledge which even today remains unappreciated and misunderstood in philosophy.”59 He 
does not really tell us why this is so. However, paying attention to the tenses used in 
Aristotle’s statement may dispel its circularity and help to understand the importance 
Heidegger attaches to it. What is present (esti) as capable of something is present as such that 
it will not (estai) be incapable of carrying out the full presence of its capacity. The 
unemployed builder is now present to us as a builder precisely because we understand the 
builder to be so disposed that, once the activity building of starts, he or she will be able to 
carry out this activity in its full extent and in all of its aspects. A slab of marble shows itself 
to us as a can-be marble sculpture precisely insofar as it is understood to be such that once 
the activity of carving a sculpture begins, there is nothing essential in the marble itself to stop 
it from going through the entire process leading to the purpose and end of carving, to the 
finished sculpture.  
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Aristotle does not give us an abstract definition of what being-capable is; he gives 
rather a phenomenological indication of how something capable is present as capable of 
something.60 From a Heideggerian viewpoint, the unique importance – and also the 
fundamental difficulty – of this indication must lie in the fact that being-present is here 
described in terms of the future, of what is not yet present. In his definition of dynamis, 
Aristotle thus comes across the temporal character of being, the transcendent constitution of 
meaningful presence through the non-present, the essential relation to absence that 
constitutes presence. This is precisely the “kinetic meaning of being-ness” which, according 
to Thomas Sheehan, is what Heidegger’s philosophy is all about.61 
 According to this reading, kinēsis and dynamis are the two Aristotelian concepts that 
offer the most radical possibilities for reappropriation. They are intimately interconnected 
and, in fact, mutually define one another. According to the famous definition in Book III of 
the Physics, movement is nothing but precisely the full and complete presence of that which 
is not yet present fully but only in capacity (dynamei on), precisely insofar as it is something 
that can and may be and thus is not yet.62 Thus the actual kinēsis of house building is simply 
the meaningful presence of a house that is not yet fully present but presently coming to 
presence. For Heidegger, this definition of movement is part and parcel of Aristotle’s great 
achievement in comparison with the earlier and the later tradition. It is precisely the 
ontological grasp of kinēsis that makes, for Heidegger, the Physics – instead of the 
Metaphysics – “the hidden, and therefore never adequately studied, foundational book of 
Western philosophy.”63  
Aristotle’s other main characterization of kinēsis is equally decisive:  
 
The reason why movement appears to be something indefinite [aoriston] is that it is not 
<simply> to be placed under the capacity nor under the being-operative of what-is [. . .] 
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Movement seems to be a kind of being-operative, but an unfinished [atelēs] one: the 
reason for this is that the capable being [to dynaton], of which movement is the being-
operative, is unfinished.64  
 
Being-in-motion is a form of being present, actualized, energeia, but it is an unfinished 
(atelēs) presence, a presence from which something is still lacking and which cannot be 
understood without reference to an end that is not yet present.  
In short, in phenomenologically elaborating the structures of dynamis and energeia, 
Aristotle gains an initial understanding of the phenomenon of world (Welt) in Heidegger’s 
sense – of the significance (Bedeutsamkeit) of the world that is given in the mode of 
“handiness” (Zuhandenheit)65, in which particular worldly beings gain their sense through 
their historical and cultural context of reference (Bewandtnis) and through their futural “for-
what-purpose,” their “in-order-to” (um zu) character. The most general structure of this 
significant givenness of beings is the temporality of being (Temporalität des Seins) that 
Heidegger intended to work out in the missing Division 3 of Part I of Being and Time, “Time 
and Being,” and later reworked under the title Ereignis.66 The temporality of being – that is, 
the temporal constitution of all meaningfulness – correlates with the ecstatic temporality of 
Dasein itself67: the self-transcendence of the opening (Da) as the context for all possible 
sense is a precondition for the self-transcendent givenness of beings within this context. The 
motivated movedness of living is not just one kind of movement or process – it is precisely 
the movement that renders possible the motional, kinetic givenness of all reality. In 1926, 
Heidegger argues that “it is indeed precisely the initial phenomenological grasp on life that 
led to the interpretation of movement and allows the radicalization of ontology.”68 The 
horizon for Aristotle’s revolutionary analysis of movement is a pre-ontological understanding 
of the motional and motivated essence of life itself.  
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Divine and mortal motivation 
Aristotle, like the long philosophical tradition after him, is fully aware of the constitutive role 
of the living consciousness for all meaningful presence: in his treatise on the soul he says that 
“the soul [psychē; understood simply as the principle of life, animation] is, in a way, all of 
what-is.”69 But despite many intimations, neither Aristotle nor the long metaphysical 
tradition after him thematized the way of being of this context for all possible 
meaningfulness and beingness – the soul, the spirit, consciousness – as an ecstatic, externally 
motivated movement, as existence.  
Yet, as we saw, Heidegger claims that “the ontological structure of human being” in 
Aristotle “becomes comprehensible on the basis of the ontology of beings in the mode of a 
specific movedness.” In other words, Aristotle does indeed find the full actuality of human 
being in a specific kind of movement. The character of this movement is explicated by 
Heidegger very clearly:  
 
Being is [for Aristotle] being-finished-and-ready [Fertigsein], i.e., a kind of being in 
which movement has arrived at its end. The being of life is seen as a movedness 
running its course within itself, and indeed human life is in this movedness when it has 
arrived at its end with regard to its ownmost possibility of movement, that is, pure and 
simple apprehending. [. . .] First, as pure and simple apprehending, nous is in its 
genuine movedness when it has given up all concern for carrying out [ausrichtendes 
Besorgen] and only apprehends. Second, as this apprehending, it is a movedness that, in 
having arrived at its end insofar as that which is purely apprehensible now stands 
before its gaze, not only does not cease, but rather now – precisely as having arrived at 
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its end – really is movement for the first time. [. . .] It is only noēsis as pure theōrein 
that satisfies the highest idea of pure movedness.70  
 
As we have seen, the full actuality and essence of life is not, in Aristotle’s eyes, to be found 
in an ecstatic outward movement. Life is fully actualized only when it has come to rest and 
reached the fullest possible self-immanence in theōrein, in contemplation and beholding. But 
theōrein is still a verb: an enactment of living, a praxis. As Heidegger repeatedly points out, 
being-at-rest is a mode of mobility – being-at-rest does not make any sense without an 
inherent possibility of movement.  
 
The purest manifestation of the essence of movedness is to be found where rest does 
not mean the breaking off and cessation of movement, but rather where movedness is 
gathered up into standing still, and where this ingathering, far from excluding 
movedness, includes and for the first time discloses it.71 
  
In theōrein, life indeed ceases its ecstatic and self-transcendent movement toward itself as a 
possibility, as a not-yet, and concentrates upon what is fully present. But in thus coming to 
rest, living is not deprived of movement. Instead, its mode of motivation changes. The 
movement of life is no longer motivated by something external, by possibilities, by the “not-
yet,” it is no longer directed outwards; it is now motivated by the simple and immediate 
intuitive reception (nous, noein) of what is completely present as such.72 In theōrein, the 
human being no longer reaches beyond its own limits, it is no longer pitched towards 
exteriority and otherness; it simply “actively” remains itself, living within the boundaries of 
its own essence, as a self-present and self-identical receptacle of the presence of the present. 
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The externally motivated, ecstatic and transcending movement of life becomes the internally 
motivated and self-immanent movement of resting within oneself. 
 In Metaphysics Theta, Ch. 6, Aristotle reserves the name kinēsis only for the first type 
of movement, which is always unfinished (atelēs), and prefers to call the latter type an 
energeia, “being-already-operative.”73 Even though he up to now has mainly used the word 
energeia to describe the completeness of produced objects, here all his examples of energeia 
are lived activities (praxeis): seeing, considering, apprehending, proper living and being 
happy.  
 
None of the activities [praxeis] for which there is a limit [peras] is an end [telos] [in 
itself], but these are rather activities that are concerned with the end [. . .], and as that 
for the sake of which [hōn heneka] the movement takes place is not present [in the 
movement itself], they are not praxis, or at least they are not complete praxis, for they 
are not ends [in themselves]. But the other kind [of activity – i.e., besides the unfinished 
activity, which is not true praxis – is truly praxis], insofar as the end and the activity 
itself are both present. For example, one has, while seeing, <at once already attained 
sight,> one has, while still considering, <already attained consideration,> one has, 
while still apprehending, already attained apprehension; whereas, while still learning 
[something], one has not already learned [it], and while still getting well, one has not 
already got well. While living properly, one has at once [hama] already attained a 
proper life, and while being happy, one has already attained happiness.74  
 
For Heidegger, energeia and entelecheia in their fundamental sense mean, for each being, the 
movement of remaining within, inhabiting its ownmost eidos, its form, that is also its telos – 
what this being as such most properly is. For humans, the most perfect energeia would thus 
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be the most perfect praxis, the most perfect way of actively living one’s life while having 
already reached perfection. As has already been shown, this supreme praxis is the pure 
beholding and contemplation of permanent truths. For humans, theōrein is an intimation of 
the activity of the divinity, noēsis noēseōs, of apprehension apprehending its own activity. 
The divinity is the immobile, unmoved mover; but since the divinity is said to be a life which 
is constantly like the one we live at our very best, its immobility cannot be understood 
negatively as a lack of activity.75 Instead, the divinity has a motivation of its own: it is the 
self-immanent activity of a perfectly self-transparent and self-coincident self-awareness. 
“The theion is noēsis noēseōs only because of the fact that with regard to the basic character 
of its being, i.e., to its movedness, such apprehending satisfies most purely the idea of being-
moved as such.”76 
The Heideggerian reappropriation of Aristotle is thus not a simple transformation of a 
“static” understanding of life into a “dynamic” and “kinetic” conception of living. It is rather 
the transition from one understanding of the movedness of life into a more original form of 
movement – the transition from a divine to a mortal mobility, the translation of the 
“theological” Western ontology into a more archaic, “anthropological” one. The Greeks 
thought movement and activity on the basis of the paradigmatic activity of resting in 
perfection; Heidegger seeks to think the most fundamental movement, the movement of 
human living, as one that never comes to a halt and never attains perfection, if not precisely 
in its imperfection. The effort of Being and Time is to show how a finite, imperfect, ecstatic, 
self-transcendent and outward-motivated movedness is the necessary but overlooked 
ontological horizon and background for the constitution of the ideal of an infinite, perfect, 
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